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ROB LUZECKY 
The Revolutionary Axiology and 
Nongeneralizable Ontology of 
Kierkegaard’s Concept of Repetition 
Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition is fraught. Walter Lowrie high-
lights the difficulties associated with an identification of the concept 
when he notes that of all the topics of Kierkegaard’s analyses, “none is 
so baffling” as that of repetition.1 Part of the problem posed by Kier-
kegaard’s elucidation of repetition is that his analyses move between the 
domains of ethics, phenomenological metaphysics, and epistemology. 
Multiple aspects of repetition are demonstrated in Kierkegaard’s explicit 
identification of the concept with “earnestness”2 —an axiologically 
loaded term, if ever there were one—an object of understanding and 
belief, namely, an intentional object (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 
136), and a phenomenon of “metaphysical interest.” Kierkegaard 
writes: “Recollection is the ethical [ethniske] view of life, repetition the 
modern; repetition is the interest [Interesse] of metaphysics, and also the 
_______ 
 1.  Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard (London: Oxford UP, 1938), 630. 
 2.  Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and Repetition, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. 
Hong, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983), 133. Hereafter cited as Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling. 
Lowrie is hardly a voice alone in the wilderness without critical and textual support. Steven Crites 
characterizes Repetition as a “teasing sort of book” in which the author leads the reader on “a merry 
chase, bobbing, hovering, backtracking through colourful meadows and dark thickets and down 
many blind alleys.” Steven Crites, “ ‘The Blissful Security of the Moment’: Recollection, Repetition, 
and Eternal Recurrence,” in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Fear and Trembling and Repetition, ed. 
Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer UP, 1993), 225–47, 225. Robert L. Perkins refers to Repetition 
as “Kierkegaard’s obscure little book.” Robert L. Perkins, Introduction to International Kierkegaard 
Commentary: Fear and Trembling and Repetition, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer UP, 1993), 
195–200, 195. This judgement is echoed by Constantin Constantius, the pseudonymous author of 
Repetition, who characterizes his elaborations as “obscurely pertaining” to the failed love affair of 
an unnamed young man. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 228.  
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interest upon which metaphysics comes to grief; repetition is the watch-
word [Løsnet] in every ethical view; repetition is conditio sine qua non [the 
indispensable condition] for every issue of dogmatics” (Fear and Trem-
bling, 149). Elsewhere, Kierkegaard suggests that what is repeated is not 
quantitatively the same. In his elaboration of the biblical tale of the trials 
and tribulations of Job, Kierkegaard explicitly notes that Job endures 
repetitions in his sufferings at the hands of a putatively merciful and 
just God (Fear and Trembling, 212). In this biblical story of immiseration, 
it is noted that the figure of Job received back double what had been 
taken from him. The implication is that the entities that are repeated—
the contents of repetition—do not enjoy quantitative identity. The ob-
servation here is that there are forms of repetition that do not require 
that the repeated content be quantitatively identical. Repeated entities 
may be qualitatively identical—that is, they can share the same qualities. 
Were a series of entities that shared the same quality or qualities to recur 
at temporally disparate moments, this recurrence would be a repetition—
a qualitative repetition. I suggest that Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition 
involves qualitative repetition. I further claim that repetition involves a 
return or instantiation of entities that enjoy the qualities of uniqueness 
and axiological valence. In this sense, what is shared among these re-
peated entities—what allows for these entities to be considered as entities 
that are genuinely repeated—are the qualities of newness and having 
value. What is comes back as new—namely, what repeats is the form 
of the new and has the quality of newness—and is laden with axiology—
namely, that which repeats has the quality of having value and is asso-
ciated with positive or negative values in some sense. Because what recurs 
at temporally discrete moments shares qualities with what was already 
realized at a temporally prior moment, this entity enjoys repetition, even 
if the quantity of particular entities varies. 
Kierkegaard’s complex formulation of the concept of qualitative 
repetition has invited a great deal of critical vexation. This is reflected 
in the lack of critical consensus about the meaning of the term. Perhaps 
inspired by the explicitly religious themes present in Kierkegaard’s 
works—for example, the analysis of the biblical story of Abraham and 
Isaac in Fear and Trembling and the elaboration the story of Job in Repe-
tition—Brita K. Stendahl characterizes repetition as akin to “a burning 
bush that is not consumed.”3 Paul S. Minear reports the odd conclusions 
of a lax ontology and suggests that repetition is the synthesis of incom-
mensurables—temporality and nontemporal eternity—that yields a kind 
_______ 
 3.  Brita K. Stendhal, Søren Kierkegaard (Boston: Twayne, 1976), 210. 
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of “divine madness” in which one “gives thanks, always.”4 John W. 
Elrod suggests that the term has existential importance in the sense that 
repetition is involved with a person’s quest to exist authentically as a 
psycho-social being.5 Elaborating on this suggestion, David J. Kangas 
briefly considers the possibility that Kierkegaard regards repetition as 
an existential category, which is oddly identified as a type of “rela-
tion . . . that freedom has with itself.”6 There are at least two problems 
with this elaboration of an existential category: (1) although relation 
might be a type of category, at least in the Aristotelian sense, it seems 
oddly specific to assert that freedom’s relation of self-identity is a category, 
and (2) there is some problem with the elaboration of the category as 
an existential category. Although the claim that repetition is categorical 
enjoys textual support, it is also observed that were this category to exist, 
it would be “absolutely transcendent” (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 
210). That a category might enjoy the status of a transcendent entity is 
not outside the realm of ontological possibility. Any of the categories 
that apply to ideal entities—that is, mathematical objects, Husserlian 
ideal-meaning units, and the like—would be strictly transcendent in that 
they might not apply to materially instantiated entities. That an abso-
lutely transcendent category still might be said to be an existential category 
is an ontological bridge too far in the sense that, at minimum, existential 
categories must involve the immanent conditions—the lived experi-
ences—of psycho-social entities. These various critical suggestions 
have been adduced to support the claim that there is little critical con-
sensus on the nature of Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition. One of the 
implications of this lack of critical consensus is that the only clarity en-
joyed by Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition is that it is clearly vague. 
The aim of the present article is to elaborate on the mercurial nature 
of repetition. I suggest that Kierkegaard conceives of repetition as a 
particular ontological entity, namely, a process or phenomenon, that 
involves axiological aspects. I claim that the temporal process of repetition 
involves axiological value in an essential sense. This is demonstrated 
with the observation that were one to try to excise value from repetition, 
the concept of repetition would be unfairly restricted. With Deleuze’s 
_______ 
 4.  Paul S. Minear, “Thanksgiving as a Synthesis of the Temporal and the Eternal,” in A 
Kierkegaard Critique: An International Selection of Essays Interpreting Kierkegaard, ed. Howard A. Johnson 
and Niels Thulstrup (New York: Harper, 1962), 226–28, 226. 
 5.  Elrod writes: “The existing individual, in the act of repetition, becomes what he is, i.e., 
becomes himself.” John W. Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1975), 229. 
 6.  David J. Kangas, Kierkegaard’s Instant: On Beginnings (Indianapolis: U of Indiana P, 2007), 103. 
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elaboration of Kierkegaard, I identify repetition as the sort of phenomenon 
that tends to resist generalization. Taken together, these analyses yield 
the conclusion that repetition is an axiologically valent entity that enjoys 
the ontological status of a particular. 
First, I identify a similarity between Kierkegaard’s characterizations 
of repetition and those specified by Marx in the first chapter of The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. I observe that Kierkegaard tends 
to emphasize the axiological aspects of repetition in the report of pseu-
donymous Constantin Constantius. Here, repetition is elaborated in ex-
plicitly axiological terms—a worthwhile trip to Berlin, an upheaval, a 
comedic farce, and such. For both Kierkegaard and Marx, repetition is 
axiologically valent in the sense that values such as good, bad, tragic, 
comic, and so on are involved with the recurrence of circumstances. A 
return trip to a city, the reemergence of the revolutionary conditions of 
1789 in the political situation of France in 1848–52—these temporal 
repetitions have axiological significance. 
Second, I suggest that Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition prefigures 
that which is elaborated by Gilles Deleuze. For both Kierkegaard and 
Deleuze, the temporal repetition involves the emergence of difference—
what is repeated is the circumstance that yields the creation of nonidentical 
entities. Though Deleuze explicitly cites Kierkegaard in his elaboration 
of the nature of repetition, Deleuze’s indebtedness to Kierkegaard on 
the subject of temporality has—for the most part—been ignored in that 
the critical literature addressing Kierkegaard’s influence on Deleuze 
tends to focus on other aspects of Deleuze’s thought. In an admirable 
recent article, Arjen Kleinherenbrink identifies Kierkegaard as influen-
tial to Deleuze’s ethics of immanence through reference to the knight 
of faith and Deleuze’s critique of normative ethical systems in both vol-
umes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia.7 Marc Katz has written a recent 
piece that elaborates Kierkegaard’s influence on Deleuze’s and Guattari’s 
thought on the nature of a conceptual limit but does not analyze what 
the implications of this are for temporal repetition.8 This is a missed 
opportunity in the sense that both Kierkegaard and Deleuze sometimes 
refer to repetition as a limit (i.e., caesura) to the progression of linear 
time. Though Lisa Trahair has recently written a detailed elaboration of 
the nature of Kierkegaard’s knight of faith through reference to what 
_______ 
 7.  Arjen Kleinherenbrink, “Art as Authentic Life—Deleuze after Kierkegaard,” Kritike 8.2 
(2014): 98–118. 
 8.  Marc Katz, “Rendezvous in Berlin: Benjamin and Kierkegaard on the Architecture of 
Repetition,” German Quarterly 71.1 (1998): 1–13. 
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Deleuze refers to as the “belief in this world,”9 the temporal aspects of 
cinema—in particular, the detailed analyses of temporal repetition in 
Cinema 2: The Time-Image—are quickly passed over.10 Sophie Wennerscheid 
follows a similar track in her elaboration of Deleuze’s and Kierkegaard’s 
similar thoughts on artistic creation.11 Though temporal repetitions cer-
tainly involve a type of ontological creation, it is overly restrictive to 
characterize these merely in terms of artistic creation. I suggest that the 
creation of a unique circumstance—that is, a temporal moment that is 
discrete from all other temporal moments—is reflected in Kierke-
gaard’s and Deleuze’s identification of repetition as a phenomenon that 
tends to resist generalization in multiple senses. 
 
Kierkegaard and Marx: The Axiological Aspect of Repetition 
 
For Kierkegaard, time is experienced as though it progresses linearly 
through a unified continuum of temporal instances (t1, t2, . . . tn). Perhaps 
what is most interesting is the supposition that from the temporal moment 
of the present that one can either move forward through time toward 
the future or backward through time to the remembered past. Kierke-
gaard explicitly identifies recollection and repetition as similar temporal 
movements, though in obverse temporal directions. Kierkegaard 
writes: “Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in 
opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, 
whereas genuine repetition is recollected forward” (Kierkegaard, Fear 
and Trembling, 210). The claim here is that recollections are just like rep-
etitions, save for the fact that repetitions actualize an undisclosed fu-
ture, although recollections actualize a previously actualized temporal 
event. Though Roger Poole starkly dismisses Kierkegaard’s concept of 
repetition, that is, recollection forward, as incoherent with his summary 
remark that “one cannot, of course, recollect forward,”12 this seems al-
together too quick in that it does not adequately reflect the psychological 
reality of one who attempts to discern the meaning of present temporal 
events or future contingencies through reference to the past. Kierke-
gaard carefully notes that his concept of recollection is borrowed from 
_______ 
 9.  Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Min-
neapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989), 172. 
 10.  Lisa Trahair, “Belief in this World: The Dardenne brothers’ The Son and Søren Kierke-
gaard’s Fear and Trembling,” SubStance 45.3 (2016): 98–119. 
 11.  Sophie Wennerscheid, “Poetics of Repetition: Nonlinearity and Queer Futurity in Philosophy 
and Literature of Memory,” Orbis litterarum 73 (2018): 383–94. 
 12.  Roger Poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication (Charlottesville: U of Virginia P, 1993), 63. 
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the Greeks. The Kierkegaardian concept of recollection is informed by 
Plato’s claim that the way to make sense of the present events—such 
as the impending execution of Socrates in Phaedo—involves a recollection 
of events that had occurred on a previous day, namely, the day that the 
Athenians put garlands on the ship that set sail to Delos.13 Phaedo’s 
remarks are of a temporally prior event, which is adduced to specify 
that they are the content of memory. Phaedo’s recollections are used to 
convey the diegetic meaning of the dialogue from the present of its 
telling until its future conclusion that, at least for the dialogue’s participants, 
comes many hours later, which demonstrates how a retelling (i.e., rep-
etition) of remembered events may be characterized as recollections 
forward—toward a narrative future.14 
Kierkegaard hints at the axiological aspects of repetition when he 
elucidates comedy as involving temporality. Kierkegaard writes: “The 
comic is a category that belongs specifically to the temporal” (Fear and 
Trembling, 327). The suggestion here is that comedy is an aspect of tem-
poral progression. Stated in starker terms, were there no such thing as 
temporal progression, namely, the repetition of discrete temporal in-
stants, then comedy would be nonexistent. Kierkegaard elaborates on 
the dependency relation through reference to the possibility of contra-
diction: “The comic always lies in contradiction [Wiederspruch]. But in 
eternity all contradictions are canceled, and the comic is consequently 
excluded” (Fear and Trembling, 327).  
Kierkegaard’s inferential progression is quite subtle. (1) It is stipu-
lated that comic phenomena are dependent on contradictory situations, 
that is, on situations in which the expected outcomes are not realized. 
(2) The enthymematic observation embedded in this stipulation is that 
temporal progression is the necessary ontological precondition for the 
emergence of contradiction—in the Kierkegaardian sense. (3) Kierke-
gaard observes that comedy would not obtain in any nontemporal—
that is, eternal—circumstance. The ontological dependency relation of 
comedy to temporality is established as the positive correlate of the 
third claim. 
_______ 
 13.  Plato, Phaedo, 58b, in Plato: The Complete Works, ed. John M Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1997), 50. 
 14.  Edward F. Mooney, makes a similar point against Poole with his suggestion that “forward 
facing recollections” (in Plato and Kierkegaard) involve a “reception of meaning that is radiating 
not from one’s past but from one’s future.” Edward F. Mooney, “Repetition: Getting the World 
Back,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair Hannay and Gordon G. Marino (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), 282–307, 288. The crucial difference here is that Mooney seems to 
imply that the future is already existent—as that from which meanings can radiate. This claim 
seems to be without textual support in either Plato or Kierkegaard. 
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Perhaps it should be noted that Kierkegaard tends to use the term 
“contradiction” in a slightly different sense than that demanded by Ar-
istotelian logic—that is, a contradiction obtains when a property (or 
attribute) is asserted both to belong and not to belong to an existent.15 
Kierkegaard often refers to the opposition of social forces or the ten-
dency of existents to be contrary to one another—that is, to be in dia-
lectical contradiction—as contradictories. It could be objected that 
even with this modified notion of contradiction, there is something a 
bit off about Kierkegaard’s suggestion that dialectical contradiction 
yields comedy. It seems that the expression of a dialectical contradiction 
could yield any number of different outcomes, to which any number of 
value predicates could apply. That is, one could imagine that a tension 
of contraries—such as those elaborated in the biblical story of Job, 
those evident in the harrowing tales of children taken from their families 
at the United States’ southern border, and so on—might not prove to 
be a source of comic amusement. In this sense, Kierkegaard’s concept 
of comedy seems more akin to Aristotle’s concept of a reversal of fortune 
(περιπέτεια) in which a person’s fate is dramatically reversed.16 Kierke-
gaard alleviates this critical concern by cautiously noting that the dialectical 
contradictions made possible by temporal progression could yield tragic 
or comic outcomes. He notes this ambiguity as he elaborates on the 
development of human personality over time: “As yet the personality 
is not discerned, and its energy is betokened only in the passion of pos-
sibility, for the same thing happens in the spiritual life as with many 
plants—the main shoot comes last. But this shadow-existence also de-
mands satisfaction, and it is never beneficial to a person if this does not 
have time to live out its life, whereas on the other hand it is tragic or 
comic if the individual makes the mistake of living out his life in it” 
(Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 327). Kierkegaard generalizes the ob-
servation that repetition produces contradictions that yield tragic or 
comic outcomes to a claim about repetition’s nature: repetition involves 
an axiological aspect. 
The axiological aspects of Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition are 
demonstrated in similarities among the thematic content of Constantius’s 
narrative and that of Kierkegaard’s essay “The Unhappiest One.”17 In 
_______ 
 15.  Aristotle identifies contradiction: “It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time 
belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect.” Aristotle, Metaphysics, 100b518–
20, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barns, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991), 489. 
 16.  Aristotle, Poetics, 1452a22, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barns, vol. 2 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991), 1460. 
 17.  Crites elaborates on this comparison when he notes that “Repetition appears to be an ex-
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the essay, Kierkegaard identifies unhappiness as involving a sense of 
temporal dislocation from the present. Constantius suggests that temporal 
repetition partially alleviates this sense of unhappiness. A brief exegesis 
of the salient points of the essay illustrates the nature of the peculiar 
type of unhappiness that Kierkegaard has in mind. 
The essay is written from the perspective of an immiserated individual 
who has been cast out of society. The narrative voice of the essay ex-
plicitly identifies himself as being among “we who live ἀϕοϱισμένοι and 
segregate,” that is, cut off or removed from society.18 Kierkegaard posits 
various possible causes for unhappiness. Among them is immortality. 
He rejects the suggestion that “the unhappiest one was the person who 
could not die, who could not slip down into a grave” (Either/Or, 182). 
Another is languishing in the strange state of having a bifurcated, self-
destructive ego. Kierkegaard identifies this as the Hegelian unhappy 
consciousness: “The unhappy one is the person who in one way or another 
has his ideal, the substance of his life, the plenitude of his consciousness, 
his essential nature, outside himself. The unhappy one is the person 
who is always absent from himself, never present to himself  ” (Either/Or, 
184). Also among the causes is the social and religious exclusion en-
dured by an anathematized person. Kierkegaard observes that the un-
happiest one might be thought of as akin to a “wandering Jew” 
(Either/Or, 182). He elucidates the most profound unhappiness as the 
feeling of being separated from the temporal domain of the present: 
“So, then, the unhappy one is absent. But one is absent when one is in 
either past or future time” (Either/Or, 184). In this sense, the most im-
miserated individuals are those for whom it is impossible to find fulfilment 
in the temporal present.  
Though the kind of happiness brought on by the sense of being dis-
placed from the present is devastating, Kierkegaard suggests that it is 
not comprehensive in that one may find a diminished measure of hap-
piness in the experience of repetition. This is the principle outcome of 
Constantius’s observation that repetition is analytically distinct from the 
feeling of hope. Kierkegaard illustrates a threefold distinction among 
hope, recollection, and repetition through a metaphor: “Hope is a new 
garment, stiff and starched and lustrous, but it has never been tried on, 
_______ 
tended illustration of a predicament sketched in a little essay in volume 1 of Either/Or, ‘ The Un-
happiest.’ ” Crites, “ ‘Blissful Security,’ ” 229. 
 18.  Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Part I, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987), 182. Hereafter cited as Kierkegaard, Either/Or. The Latin term 
segregati is identified as a translation of the Greek ἀφωϱισμένοι, which is identified as meaning 
“social exclusion.” Kierkegaard, Either/Or, ft. 5, 521. 
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and therefore one does not know how becoming it will be or how it 
will fit. Recollection is a discarded garment that does not fit, however 
beautiful it is, for one has outgrown it. Repetition is an indestructible 
garment that fits closely and tenderly, neither binds nor sags” (Fear and 
Trembling, 132). The key difference between hope and repetition is an 
analogue to the difference between actual and potential. Hope is iden-
tified as enjoying a potential mode of existence that never becomes re-
alized. The claim here is that one never receives what one hopes for. 
That is, hope is characterized “as the maiden that slips away through 
one’s figures” (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 132). Repetitions, however, 
enjoy an actual mode of existence in that they are realized. That is, rec-
ollections are characterized as the “beloved wife of whom one never 
wearies” (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 132). The axiological impli-
cation of the distinction is that repetition partially alleviates the unhap-
piness of those who have lost a sense of inhabiting the present; because 
it is actualized, repetition brings a modicum of happiness to those mis-
erable people who feel no relation to their present circumstance. 
An analogue to Kierkegaard’s ambivalence about the particular axi-
ological value of a repetition—an ambivalence that is based on the ex-
istence of axiological aspects of repetition in general—is found in 
Marx’s elaboration of the revolutionary tumult that swept through 
France from 1848 to 1852. A clue to the importance of axiological aspects 
of repetition—elaborated in terms of the recurrence of revolutionary 
conditions—is found in Marx’s observation that history repeats itself 
“the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.”19 Derrida elaborates on 
the connection of value and repetition, observing that Marx derives joy 
from “taking the pulse” of the rhythmic repetitions of history.20 This is 
not to say that Marx saw the revolutionary tumult of his age through 
rose-colored lenses. Marx explicitly notes the negative axiological values 
of the recollections of the past glories of the 1789 revolt in his charac-
terization of these as the “tradition of all the dead generations that 
weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living” (Marx, Eighteenth 
Brumaire, 10). In a particularly rhetorically loaded passage, Marx cau-
tiously warns against the dangers of celebrating the memory of an overly 
romanticized vision of the “defunct epoch” of a revolutionary past. 
_______ 
 19.  Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Moscow: Progress, 1972), 15. Here-
after cited as Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire. Marx seems to be referring to Hegel’s remarks on the 
numerous political revolutions of ancient Rome: “By repetition that which at first appeared merely 
a matter of chance and contingency becomes a real and ratified existence.” G. W. F. Hegel, The 
Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (Kitchener, Ont.: Batoche, 2001), 342. 
 20.  Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International, trans. Peggy Kaumf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 139–40. 
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An entire people, which had imagined that by means of a revolution 
it had imparted to itself an accelerated power of motion, suddenly 
finds itself set back into a defunct epoch and, in order that no doubt 
as to the relapse may be possible, the old dates arise again, the old 
chronology, the old names, the old edicts, which had long become a 
subject of antiquarian erudition, and the old minions of the law, who 
had seemed long decayed. The nation feels like that mad Englishman 
in Bedlam who fancies that he lives in the times of the ancient Pharaohs 
and daily bemoans the hard labour that he must perform in the Ethi-
opian mines as a gold digger, immured in this subterranean prison, a 
dimly burning lamp fastened to his head, the overseer of the slaves 
behind him with a long whip, and at the exits a confused welter of 
barbarian mercenaries, who understand neither the forced labourers 
in the mines nor one another, since they speak no common language. 
(Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire, 12) 
Marx identifies two problems involved with the recollection of past 
revolutionary glories: the tendency to give rise to both (1) an unwar-
ranted sense of revolutionary hope, that is, to an “imagined acceleration 
of motion,” and (2) a mass sense of confused temporal dislocation, 
namely, the lived experience of the population of a “nation [that] feels 
like that mad Englishman in Bedlam who fancies that he lives in the 
times of the ancient Pharaohs” (Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire, 12). Marx’s 
ambivalence to the revolutionary potential heralded by temporal revolution 
is implied in the enticing observation that repetitions can be temporal 
reinstantiations of the “poetry of the past” (Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire, 
12). Despite the failures of past revolutions, these are the dialectical 
preconditions necessary to liberate the French peasantry from their im-
miserating social conditions. Marx writes: “But the parody of the em-
pire . . . was necessary to free the mass of the French nation from the 
weight of tradition and to work out in pure form the opposition be-
tween the state power and society. With the progressive undermining 
of smallholding property, the state structure erected upon it collapses” 
(Eighteenth Brumaire, 112). This is the expression of a revolutionary hope. 
William Lyon McBride identifies Marx’s expression of feeling of the 
immanent possibility of positive social and political change as one of 
the most substantive indicators of Marx’s optimistic comportment to 
the future of Europe.21 This is further observed in Engels’ characteri-
zation of Marx as a “revolutionist” who—well aware of the immanent 
possibility of the repetition of negative values—was always firmly on 
_______ 
 21.  William Lyon McBride, The Philosophy of Marx (New York: St. Martin’s P, 1977), 116. 
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the side of the poor made miserable by capitalism.22 This is the expression 
of a revolutionary hope for the possibility of a successful revolution. 
Such a hope can only operate when one grants that repetitions involve 
axiological aspects. 
 
Kierkegaard and Deleuze: The Ontology of Repetition 
 
“Repetition is not generality.”23 With this enticing first line to Difference 
and Repetition, Deleuze hints at the kinship of his concept of repetition 
with that elaborated by Kierkegaard. Though Kierkegaard’s explicit 
claim that repetition is not “ideality” (i.e., generality) provides textual 
support to demonstrate the connection between Kierkegaard and 
Deleuze, the content of the claim invites question. Kierkegaard writes: 
“In ideality alone there is no repetition, for the idea is and remains the 
same and as such cannot be repeated. When ideality and reality touch 
each other, then repetition occurs. When, for example, I see something 
in the moment, ideality enters in and will explain that it is a repetition” 
(Fear and Trembling, 275). Although the logical operation of negation is 
easily understandable, the suggestion that repetition is not generality 
demands clarification. 
Deleuze tends to elucidate “generality” as involving an appeal to various 
transcendent criteria. This includes, for example, the generality of a natural 
law, which is comprehensible to any psycho-social entity, the generality 
of a moral law that could serve as normative constraint, and the gener-
ality of a habit evidenced by a group of people. Repetition involves op-
positions to all these. Deleuze’s claim is that repetition does not involve 
an appeal to a natural law, an appeal to a moral law, or an appeal to 
habit. He specifies that repetition is analytically discrete from generality 
if it fulfils three conditions. (1) The phenomenon of repetition must 
involve a “selective test” (i.e., an instant in which a selective determination 
is made). Deleuze writes: “Make something new of repetition itself: 
connect it with a test, with a selection or selective test; make it the su-
preme object of the will and of freedom” (Difference, 6). (2) Repetition 
is characterized as nonidentifiable with any of the “laws of nature” or 
“moral laws” (Deleuze, Difference, 6). (3) Repetition is nonreducible to 
the generality of habit. Deleuze writes: “Oppose repetition not only to 
_______ 
 22.  Friedrich Engels, Speech at the Graveside of Marx, in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. 
Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 681–82, 682. 
 23.  Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, (London: Continuum, 2001), 1. 
Hereafter cited as Deleuze, Difference. 
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the generalities of habit but also to the particularities of memory” (Dif-
ference, 6). The mercurial nature of each of these conditions invites clar-
ification. 
For Deleuze, a selective test is the selection of the new, that is, the 
unique or that which is without ontological precedent or correlate. At 
key moments in Repetition and Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard illustrates 
the selective nature of repetition. It is hinted at in the subtitle of Repetition, 
which identifies the text as a young man’s “psychological experiment” 
to determine whether repetition is possible. The young man discovers 
that his attempts to create a temporal repetition are for naught in that—
despite his best efforts—an exact recreation of his previous trip to Berlin 
is impossible.24 The details of his most recent trip to Berlin differ con-
siderably from those of his previous trip, so the experiment produces a 
unique trip, not a repetition of a previous journey. Perhaps the most 
dramatic illustration of a selective test is found in Kierkegaard’s eluci-
dation of the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac. Kierkegaard cau-
tiously notes that the story is illustrative of two distinct conceptual 
“movements”: the resignation illustrated by Abraham’s willingness to 
sacrifice Isaac, and the acceptance of the “absurd” hypothesis that God 
will give him a new Isaac. Kierkegaard writes: “Abraham makes two 
movements. He makes the infinite movement of resignation and gives 
up Isaac, which no one can understand because it is a private venture; 
but next, at every moment, he makes the movement of faith. This is his 
consolation. In other words, he is saying: But it will not happen, or if it 
does, the Lord will give me a new Isaac, that is, by virtue of the absurd” 
(Fear and Trembling, 115). Taken together, these two movements constitute 
a selective test that aims at the perhaps false belief in the creation of an 
ontologically unique entity, namely, the new, unsacrificed son. Both the 
young man’s psychological experiment and Abraham’s choice to at-
tempt to murder his son illustrate the claim that repetition resists gen-
erality in that the selective test involved in each functions as the ontic 
precondition of the emergence of a nongeneralizable entity (i.e., a sin-
gularity). 
In his elaboration of Deleuze’s analysis of Kierkegaard’s discussion 
of the tribulations of Job, Henry Somers-Hall observes that natural and 
moral laws must fulfil a minimal condition of intelligibility.25 The claim 
_______ 
 24.  Kierkegaard’s unnamed young man arrives at this conclusion after discovering that the 
landlord of his lodging house had got married: “But here, alas, again no repetition was possible. 
My landlord, the druggist . . . had married.” Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 152. 
 25.  Henry Somers-Hall, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide (Ed-
inburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2013), 12. 
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here is that for an entity to be considered a law, it must be compre-
hended by the category of the thinkable. That is, a natural law must 
figure in the domain of scientific discourse as a subject of analysis, an 
object to be analyzed, a regulative principle, a limit condition, and so 
on; a moral law must figure in a normative discourse in analogous ways. 
Kierkegaard suggests that repetition does not meet this condition in the 
narrow sense that repetition seems to involve an ineffable relation with 
the divine. Kierkegaard hints at the necessarily vague quality of repetition 
when he observes that Job’s repeated immiserations are “hard to say in 
any human language.” Though Kierkegaard cautiously notes that repe-
tition—characterized as the recurring “rebuke of God”—is an existent 
phenomena, he also observes that repetitions only occur “when every 
thinkable human certainty and probability were impossible” (Kierke-
gaard, Fear and Trembling, 212). The ontological implication is staggering: 
repetition involves an ineffable aspect that resists generalization into 
natural or moral law. 
The identification of the ineffable aspects of repetition has im-
portant implications for Deleuze’s observation that repetition need not 
be generalized as habit. In his elaboration of the misadventures of Job, 
Kierkegaard tends to characterize repetition in apocalyptic terms—that 
is, as involving any spiritual, psychological, or physical destruction. 
John D. Caputo observes that Job may be classified as the “teacher of 
repetition”26 in that his repeated immiserations serve as an ominous 
warning of the negative effect of the repetitive succession of temporal 
instants. Kierkegaard elaborates on the calamitous nature of repetition 
by referencing the metaphor of thunderstorm that leaves one shattered, 
in multiple senses: “I am waiting for the thunderstorm—and for repetition. 
And yet I would be happy and indescribably blessed if the thunder-
storm would only come, even if my sentence were that no repetition is 
possible. . . .  What will be the effect of this thunderstorm? . . . It will 
shatter my whole personality—I am prepared. It will render me almost 
unrecognizable to myself  ” (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 214). The 
characterizations of repetition as involving a radical break imply that 
habit—typically identified as a type of repetition, namely, as habitual 
action, any of the unconscious ticks, twitches, spasms, and so on that 
tend to affect material entities recurrently—is in fact analytically distinct 
from repetition. Kierkegaard explicitly draws this distinction when he 
specifies that repetition, identified with the character trait of earnestness, 
_______ 
 26.  John D. Caputo, “Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Foundering of Metaphysics,” in “Fear 
and Trembling” and “Repetition,” vol. 6 of International Kierkegaard Commentary, ed. Robert L. Perkins 
(Macon, GA: Mercer UP, 1993), 201–25, 216. 
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is ontologically primary to habit (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 327). 
The implication here is that repetition enjoys a relative autonomy in 
that it is independent of habit—that is, habit depends on repetition, not 
the other way around. 
When we take the above observations about the nature of repetition 
together, a striking ontological picture emerges. Repetition is identified 
as an ontologically primordial process of selection—a test—that seems 
to resist formalization into general moral or natural law inasmuch as 
there is an ineffable—namely, a nonlinguistic, nonconceptualizable—
aspect to the repetitions. In this sense, repetition is a break in the strictly 
linear concept of temporal flow expressed in the habitual actions of 
material entities. In every instance, the phenomenon of repetition tends 
be characterized as the ontologically particular process that is analyti-




In his final letter to Constantius, the nameless young man elaborates 
on the nature of repetition through reference to Ilithyia, the Greek goddess 
of childbirth. The reference is apt in that the text of the metaphorically 
rich passage illustrates the axiological and ontological significance of 
repetition. The axiological aspects of repetition are highlighted when 
the narrative voice characterizes his experience of repetition as akin to 
that of a skiff adrift on tumultuous seas that “spume with elemental 
fury” (Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 221). The ontological particularity 
of the process of repetition—that is, its capacities to produce the new, 
the object without precedent—is elaborated in the identification of rep-
etition as a liberation of temporally prior circumstances. 
I here have adduced the existence of the axiological aspect of repe-
tition through reference to Kierkegaard and Marx. Value—comedy, 
tragedy, and such—is involved with the repetition of temporal moments. 
Any attempt to excise axiological qualities from temporal repetition—
that is, to treat it as something discrete—implies a diminishment of the 
concept. The intimate relation of repetition and value is illustrated by 
Marx’s explicit characterizations of the repetition of revolutionary cir-
cumstances as involving value.  
Deleuze’s observation that repetition tends to enjoy a nongeneral 
ontological status adduces the ontological particularity of repetition. He 
carefully identifies a series of conditions that an existent must meet in 
order be considered as nongeneralizable: the existent must involve a 
selective test, it tends to be resistant to formalization as a moral or natural 
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law, and it enjoys an ontological status that is different from that of the 
generality of habit. Kierkegaard’s nuanced elaboration of repetition 
demonstrates that repetition tends to satisfy these. The substantive 
claim is that repetition enjoys an ontological status as a radically particular 
process that involves the value-laden creation of the new. 
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